The contrast between the United States and Canada is evident in the mythologies around our founding heads of government.
On the American side, we have the story of young George Washington admitting to his father, “Sir, I cannot tell a lie,” having chopped down the cherry tree.
On the Canadian, we have the boozing Sir John A. Macdonald confronting a junior minister under the influence: “Out man, there’s only room for one drunk in this Cabinet!”
One story highlights virtue, the other, vice. At the risk of belaboring simple anecdotes, we observe that the Washington story shows the clean break and purist spirit with which Americans viewed their beginnings. The Macdonald story highlights human frailties.
The routes by which the two men came to head their countries mirrors this contrast. One led Revolutionary armies through long marches and cold winters in what often seemed a losing campaign. There is a certain deserved heroism here.
The other participated and eventually presided at a marathon of meetings that probably took liquor to lubricate the consensus that emerged. The political agreement was followed by a spending campaign to buy the support of Maritimers opposed to the deal.
An inquiry into an alleged 1980’s scandal into Airbus purchases introduced Canadians to the word schmiergeld (“grease money”) paid by a German lobbyist. The word was new, but the concept has been with Canadians from Confederation.
Canadians follow Europeans’ use of the word “compromise” as necessary to reach a political goal. The word is more ambiguous for many Americans, implying a sellout of one’s principles.
Deal-making is an inescapable part of politics in all countries. In its absence are schism and civil conflict. At an international level, unwillingness to compromise can lead to war.
Yet many countries require their leaders to be bellicose before they can be compromising. Almost every incoming American President since World War II has had to show himself “tough” before he can be conciliatory, to avoid appearance of weakness.
John F. Kennedy had to confront the Soviets in Cuba before he could sign a nuclear test ban treaty with them. Ronald Reagan had to rearm Europe with new nuclear missiles before he could meet with Soviet President Gorbachev to negotiate dismantling them.
Richard Nixon could open the door to Communist China, having already proven his anti-Communist credentials. Lyndon Johnson tried to prove himself in Vietnam, to his chagrin. George Bush I’s successful waging of the Gulf War did not ensure his reelection.
Canadian prime ministers are also expected to show themselves “decisive” after their election, but this seldom involves a show of force. The only post-War Canadian PM to face such a test was Pierre Trudeau in a 1970 terrorist crisis, where he called in the army. The most decisive stand of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien was his choice not to join the US-led Iraq War.
Many Canadian prime ministers demonstrate their leadership in new social programs and economic initiatives. These often entail negotiations with provincial premiers, given the decentralized nature of Canadian federalism. A number of Canada PM’s have come from backgrounds of labour law and diplomacy, skills necessary to make the federation work.
If some Americans view their military leadership as more principled, Canadians must avoid viewing our diplomatic approach with superiority. Without longstanding global interests of our own, we cannot afford to be self-righteous in comparing ourselves to those who do.
The resolute stand of George Washington and the wheeling and dealing of Sir John A. Macdonald are both essential elements of leadership. Neither equates with virtue. Both can be vices in excess: one as stubbornness, the other as spinelessness.
Such a balanced approach to leadership was expressed by President John F. Kennedy in a State of the Union address: “The eagle on the Presidential coat of arms holds in one talon an olive branch and in the other, a bundle of arrows. We intend to give equal attention to both…”
No comments:
Post a Comment